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STATE OF UTAH, 
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Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
W.E.M. appeals from an adjudication for assault against a school 
employee. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-4-
103(2)(c). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
W.E.M. and his friends had been pushing one another into other 
students as they walked the halls of their junior high school. One morning 
when W.E.M.'s friend pushed him, W.E.M. lowered his shoulder before 
crashing into an assistant principal. 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to establish that W.E.M. assaulted a 
school employee with knowledge that she was a school employee? 
2. If not, was the evidence sufficient to establish that W.E.M. 
committed a simple assault? 
Standard of Review for Issues 1 & 2. This Court reviews challenges to 
the sufficiency of the evidence under the dear-error standard. In re Z.D., 
2006 UT 54, ,r,r 28-29, 147 P.3d 401. Under that standard, this Court may 
reverse only if, giving "due regard ... to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses," Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a), it determines 
that the finding is "against the clear weight of the evidence" or this Court 
"otherwise reaches a definite and £inn conviction that a 1nistake has been 
made," In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54, ,r 32 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
However, this Court reviews for correctness any legal conclusions 
undergirding the juvenile court's findings. See In re C.C., 2013 UT 26, ,r 12, 
301 P.3d 1000. 
3. Should the Court second-guess the decision whether to refer 
W.E.M. to juvenile court and to proceed with an adjudication for assault 
against a school employee? 
Standard of Review. Determining the availability of relief based on the 





legal question[]" that is reviewed for correctness. See In re Adoption of Baby 
B., 2012 UT 35, ,r 41, 308 P.3d 382 ( discussing general standards of review). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-2-103 (West 2015) (mental states); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (West 2004) (simple assault); and 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-102.3 (West 2015) (assault against school 
employees). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State filed a petition on March 6, 2015, alleging that W.E.M. 
assaulted a school employee, which would be a Class A misdemeanor if 
committed by an adult. Rl-2; see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.3 (West 2015). 
Following a hearing on July 31, 2015, the juvenile court adjudicated W.E.M. 
as has having committed the offense and thus falling within the jurisdiction 
of the juvenile court. R51. 
The assault allegation arose from a December 9, 2014 incident. R1. 
But the context of that incident stretched back several weeks. R56:97. Sherri 
Branch, an assistant principal at Eisenhower Junior High, heard "multiple 
reports" that W.E.M. and others had been "shoulder checking" other 
students in the halls of the school. R56:82-83, 94-95, 97. As W.E.M.' s 
friend, K.J ., described it, one of them would bump into the other, and the 
second person would then bump into a non-participant in the hall. R56:27-
-3-
28. W.E.M. said they only did it to friends, R56:71-75, but K.J. said they 
were "just kind of doing it to random people," R56:29, 34. Although W.E.M. 
described their actions as "just ... 1nessing around," R56:73, and K.J. 
described it as "just goofing off," R56:28, W.E.M. acknowledged that he was 
aware people could get hurt as a result of their actions, R56:72-73, 75. 
In response to the reports of shoulder checking, Branch confronted 
W.E.M. and warned him stop. R56:99-100. She also increased patrols of the 
hallways. R56:96. 
Brenda Zimmerman, who was interning as an assistant principal, was 
on one such patrol with another teacher in the minutes before school started 
on the morning of December 9. R56:10, 13. The halls were quite crowded. 
R56:16. Zimmerman turned the corner from C-Hall and headed west down 
B-Hall. R56:12. W.E.M. and K.J. were in B-Hall, headed east toward C-Hall, 
and they had been pushing each other. 1 R56:29, 32-33, 35. K.J. pushed 
W.E.M. and, in one fluid motion as he passed Zimmerman, W.E.M. lowered 
his left shoulder and hit Zimmerman in her left shoulder. R56:10, 15. The 
1 W.E.M. testified that he had not pushed anyone that day. R56:64. 
But K.J. indicated that W.E.M. had been pushing him earlier that morning. 
R56:32 ("We're doing it in other halls too but right here it was me bumping 
into W."). 
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blow knocked Zimmerman off balance and "hurt like it would hurt when 
someone hits your arm hard." R56:11. Zimmennan "looked back to 1nake 
sure [she] knew who did that," but continued down the hall, where she saw 
the principal and reported the incident. R56:11, 15, 23. A short time later 
she reported to Branch, her immediate supervisor, that W.E.M. had 
"shoulder checked" her. R56:84-85. 
W.E.M. said he "turned around to see who it was" and was 
embarrassed when he saw Zimmerman, but he and K.J. continued down the 
hall. R56:35-36, 65-66. Soon after, K.J. pushed W.E.M. again and W.E.M. 
lost his balance. R56:50, 66. As a school resource officer described it based 
on a surveillance video, W.E.M. 0 took a stumble like he tripped over his 
foot," colliding with another student on the other side of the hall. R56:50, 
52. 
W.E.M. knew who Zhnmerman was from prior interactions the two 
had had in her capacity as an administrator. R56:15-16. Although 
Zimmerman could not recall how long after she rounded the corner W.E.M. 
shoulder checked her, R56:12, and although W.E.M. testified that he did not 
see Zimmerman until he collided with her, R56:65, the two were facing each 
other as they headed opposite directions down the hall and W.E.M. would 
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have had the opportunity to see Zimmerman, even if only briefly-just as 
she saw him "walking towards [her]," R56:10-12, 35. 
Based on the foregoing, the juvenile court determined that the State 
had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that W.E.M. had assaulted a school 
employee. RSl-52; R56:115-18. The court imposed a suspended five-day 
term of detention, ordered W.E.M. to serve twenty hours of compensatory 
service, and ordered him to write a letter of apology to Zimmerman. RSl-
52; R56:117-18. 
W.E.M. timely appealed. R54. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
W.E.M. raises a nu1nber of issues in his opening brief, but this appeal 
is at heart a dispute about the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 
W.E.M.' s adjudication. He argues that the evidence was insufficient 
because (1) he was pushed and thus hit Zimmennan accidentally, not 
voluntarily, (2) he did not know he hit Zin1merman until after he hit her, 
and (3) he did not target Zimmennan. 
The last assertion conflicts with the statute's plain language. The 
statute requires only that a person committing an assault knows that the 
victhn is a school employee at the time of the assault. It does not require 
-6-
proof that the assailant targeted the victhn for an assault based on her status 
as a school employee. 
Here, the evidence supports the actual elements of assault of a school 
employee: W.E.M. voluntarily shoulder checked his victim, and he knew he 
was shoulder checking Zimmerman, whom he ad1nitted he knew was a 
school employee. The juvenile court could reasonably draw these 
inferences because W.E.M. lowered his shoulder as he crashed into 
Zimmerman in one fluid motion, W.E.M. and Zimmerman were face-to-face 
before the assault, and Zhnmerman was able to see W.E.M. before he 
shoulder checked her. Furthermore, the juvenile court implicitly rejected 
W.E.M.'s testimony that he did not see Zimmerman beforehand. Such 
credibility determinations are given particular deference on appeal. When 
viewed with the appropriate level of deference to the juvenile court, the 
evidence was sufficient for the court to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 
that W.E.M. assaulted a school employee with knowledge of the victim's 
status. 
However, if this Court disagrees, it should remand for entry of an 
adjudication for assault, for by W.E.M.' s own admission, he acted with 
awareness of the risk that bodily injury could result fr01n his actions and he 
thus had the requisite 1nental state for the lesser-included offense of assault. 
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W.E.M. also takes issue with the referral of his case to juvenile court. 
But that decision is within the discretion of the referring officer. W.E.M. 
does not allege any procedural error in the referral and adjudication of his 
case. Because the evidence supports the conclusion that the juvenile court 
has jurisdiction over W.E.M.-whether due to his commission of assault 
against a school employee or its lesser-included offense-W.E.M.'s policy 
arguments challenging his referral to juvenile court are unpersuasive and 
beside the point. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE INFERENCE THAT 
W.E.M. SAW THE SCHOOL EMPLOYEE AND 
VOLUNTARILY SHOULDER CHECKED HER, THUS 
SUPPORTING THE JUVENILE COURT'S FINDING 
THAT HE KNOWINGLY ASSAULTED A SCHOOL 
EMPLOYEE. 
W.E.M. argues that the State's evidence was insufficient to prove 
assault of a school employee because, he says, it did not prove (1) that he 
cmnmitted a voluntary act when he hit Zimmerman, and (2) that he knew 
he was hitting Zimmerman until it was too late.2 W.E.M. also argues that 
2 W.E.M. does not challenge any other element of the statute, 
including that Zimmerman was a school employee, that she was acting 
within the scope of her duties at the time of the incident, and that she 
( ... continued on next page) 
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@ 
the statute required the State to prove that he targeted Zimmerman for the 
assault based on her status as a school ern.ployee, and the evidence failed to 
prove that. 
But the evidence sl)owed that W.E.M. lowered his shoulder then 
crashed into Zimmerman in one fluid motion. From this, the juvenile court 
could reject his contention that he was involuntarily pushed into 
Zimmerman and could infer that he voluntarily participated in shoulder 
checking her. The evidence was also sufficient for the court to find that 
W.E.M. knew he was hitting Zimmerman: They were face-to-face at the 
time he assaulted her and W.E.M. had an opportunity to see Zimmerman 
before he shoulder checked her. And the statute does not require 
intentional targeting of a school employee; rather, it requires only that a 
person commit an assault knowing that the victim is a school employee. 
The evidence supports that finding beyond a reasonable doubt.3 
suffered bodily injury as a result. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.3. In fact, 
W.E.M. does not even dispute that he knew Zimmerman was a school 
employee. 
3 W.E.M. also argues that "[n]owhere did the juvenile court address 
the evidence in light of the beyond a reasonable doubt burden." Aplt. Br. at 
30. In fact, the juvenile court began the announcement of its ruling by 
stating, "I find the following has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 
R56:116. The court reiterated that standard in its written order. R51. To the 
( ... continued on next page) 
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A. Evidence that W.E.M. lowered his shoulder and 
crashed into the school employee in one fluid motion 
provided a basis for the juvenile court to reasonably 
conclude that W.E.M. voluntarily hit the school 
employee. 
W.E.M. argues that it was all an accident-that he did not voluntarily 
hit Zhnmerman because his friend pushed him into her. Aplt. Br. at 13, 27-
28. But the evidence supports the juvenile court's conclusion that W.E.M. 
voluntarily participated in a shoulder-checking assault. 
Zimmerman testified that W.E.M. lowered his shoulder then crashed 
into her in a single fluid motion. R56:10, 15. It was reasonable for the 
juvenile court to infer that the lowering of the shoulder was a voluntary act. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(1) (West 2015) ("' Act' means a voluntary 
bodily movement and includes speech."). And it was reasonable to infer 
extent W.E.M. is arguing that the law required the juvenile court to do 
something more to demonstrate that it applied the proper standard, W.E.M. 
never brought that argument to the juvenile court's attention. R56:115-19. 
Therefore, this Court should not address it. See 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, 
Inc., 2004 UT 72, ,r 51, 99 P.3d 801 ("Issues that are not raised at trial are 
usually deen1ed waived."). To the extent W.E.M. is silnply arguing that the 
evidence was insufficient to establish the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard, that issue is properly before the Court. Cf In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54, 
ir 27 (noting that the burden of proof is relevant to appellate review of a 
lower court's findings, but that it is "subordinate to the standard of review 
set out in rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure"). 
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that W.E.M. lowered his shoulder in preparation for the shoulder check, and 
thus to reject his contention that he was pushed into her involuntarily. 
Furthermore, W.E.M.'s own witness testified that W.E.M. had been 
involved in "multiple" prior incidents of shoulder checking in the halls. 
R56:83, 94-95, 97. W.E.M.' s prior participation in actively shoulder 
checking others makes it less likely that this occasion of shoulder checking 
was accidental. "An innocent person may be falsely accused or suffer an 
unfortunate accident, but when several independent accusations arise or 
multiple similar 'accidents' occur, the objective probability that the accused 
innocently suffered such unfortunate coincidences decreases." State v. 
Verde, 2012 UT 60, ,I 49, 296 P.3d 673; see also State v. Labrum, 2014 UT App 5, 
,r,I 29-31, 318 P.3d 1151 (explaining that "the repetition of several 
distinctively similar acts" makes it less likely as a 1natter of logic that the act 
in question was accidental). Zimmerman's description of W.E.M.' s action to 
her supervisor-" shoulder checked" -suggests a voluntary act. R56:84. 
That description is qualitatively different from the school resource officer's 
description of W.E.M's subsequent accidental collision with another 
student- "he took a stumble like he tripped over his foot." R56:50. 
W.E.M.' s multiple prior incidents of shoulder checking thus reinforce the 
juvenile court's inference that the present incident was not accidental. 
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While the juvenile court could have drawn contrary inferences from 
the evidence, the evidence did not clearly weigh against the inference the 
court did draw: that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that 
W.E.M. voluntarily shoulder checked Zimmerman. See Edwards v. Powder 
Mountain Water & Sewer, 2009 UT App 185, ,r 25, 214 P.3d 120 (stating that 
an appellate court "1nust uphold a trial court's factual findings ... unless 
the evidence clearly weighs against such findings"). 4 
B. A juvenile need not target a school employee to be 
adjudicated of assaulting a school employee; it is 
enough if he knows at the time of the assault that his 
victim is a school employee. 
W.E.M. argues that he should not have been adjudicated of assault of 
a school en1ployee because "there was no evidence that" he "targeted Ms. 
Zhnmerman" or even had any "intended targets at all." Aplt. Br. at 22, 25. 
He asserts that interpreting the statute to require proof of intentional 
targeting is required because the statute creates a special privilege for school 
4 W.E.M. also argues that the evidence was insufficient under an 
accomplice theory because he lacked the requisite 1nental state and did not 
solicit, request, cmnmand, encourage, or intentionally aid K.J. in assaulting 
a school employee. Aplt. Br. at 25-27. Although the prosecutor argued an 
accomplice theory below, R56:61, 105, the juvenile court did not rely on that 
theory in its ruling, R56:115-17. And as discussed above, the evidence was 
sufficient to support the conclusion that W.E.M. acted as a principal. 
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employees and therefore must be strictly construed in his favor. Aplt. Br. at 
28. 
The State agrees that under section 76-5-102.3, a person must be 
aware of the victim's status at the time of the assault. But by its own terms, 
the statute requires only knowledge of the employee's status, not a specific 
intent to assault a school employee based her status as a school employee. 
The statute incorporates the offense of assault and adds additional 
elements, including the requirement that the offender act with knowledge 
of the victim's status: 
Any person who assaults an employee of a public or private 
school, with knowledge that the individual is an employee, and 
when the en1ployee is acting within the scope of his authority 
as an e1nployee, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-102.3 (emphasis added). By its plain tenns, then, the 
statute only required the State to prove that W.E.M. knew that Zimmerman 
was a school employee. It did not require the State to prove that he 
assaulted her because of her status as a school employee. 
In arguing that the State was required to prove that he intentionally 
targeted or directed his action toward a school employee, W .E.M. seems to 
present a binary choice between intentional targeting and strict liability. 
Aplt. Br. at 23-24 (equating the prosecutor's argument as advocating for 
strict liability when she argued that the statute does not require the actor to 
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specifically target a school employee). This argu1nent depends on a false 
dichotomy, that assault of a school e1nployee 1nust be a strict liability 
crime-one that requires no mental state at all- if the State does not have to 
prove that W.E.M. assaulted Zimmerman for the purpose of assaulting a 
school employee. But Utah law recognizes lesser mental states. The one 
expressly adopted by the assault-of-a-school-employee statute is "with 
knowledge." Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-102.3. That required the State to prove 
only that W.E.M. was "aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances ... [or] that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause [a 
particular] result." Id. § 76-2-103(2) (West 2015) (defining "with 
knowledge"). Because the State had to prove that W.E.M. was at least 
aware that his victim was a school employee, it imposed a mental state 
requirement; consequently, it was not a sh·ict liability crime. Imposing an 
even higher mental state would "do violence" to the statute's plain 
language. Cf Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 594 (1989). 
Further, W.E.M.' s argu1nent for a heightened mental state rests on a 
misconception of the statute's effect. He argues that the Court must read 
into the statute an intent to assault a school employee based on her status as 
a school employee because, he says, the statute creates special privileges for 
school employees. He is wrong. A "privilege" is a "special legal right, 
-14-
·'Vii} 
exemption, or immunity granted to a person or class of persons." Black's 
Law Dictionary 1234 (8th ed. 2004). As such, it "grants son1eone the legal 
freedmn to do or not to do a given act" and "hnmunizes conduct that, under 
ordinary circumstances, would subject the actor to liability." Id. And 
"special privilege" is a term of art, referring to " [a] privilege granted to a 
person or class of persons to the exclusion of others and in derogation of the 
common right." Id. at 1235 ( emphasis added). The cases W.E.M. cites reflect 
that specialized definition. See, e.g., Moran v. Miami City Comm'rs, 67 U.S. 
722, 722-24 (1862) (examining a legislative charter that gave railroad 
company the special privilege of having counties raise public funds on its 
behalf); see also Rice v. Minnesota & N. W. R. Co., 66 U.S. 358, 370-71 (1861) 
(examining a legislative charter that gave railroad company the special 
privilege of exercising the territory's power of eminent domain). 
Here, the legislature plainly intended to provide special protection to 
those who provide a critical public service in educating youth. The statute 
accomplishes its aim by increasing the penalty when someone commits an 
assault knowing that his victim is a school employee. Compare Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-102(2), with id. § 76-5-102.3(2). 
But the statute grants no special rights to school employees to do 
things that others would not be allowed to do. Thus, not only is the special-
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privilege rule inapplicable, but the statute's purpose of protecting school 
employees is best served not by ratcheting up the required 1nental state, but 
by adhering to the plain language of the text. 5 
C. The juvenile court could reasonably conclude that 
W.E.M. knew he was assaulting a school employee. 
W.E.M. argues that he did not know whom he hit until after the fact, 
and that he therefore lacked the requisite mental state to be adjudicated as 
having assaulted a school employee. Aplt. Br. at 20-25. The State presented 
sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's contrary conclusion. 
W.E.M. does not dispute that he knew prior to the incident that 
5 W.E.M. also argues that, under the doch·ine of transferred intent, 
W.E.M.' s intent to hit other students cannot be used as a substitute for 
intent to hit a school employee. Aplt. Br. at 21-22. W.E.M.'s transferred-
intent argument is correct, but beside the point. Under Utah law, intent 
transfers from one victim to another, but not from one offense to another. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-105 (West 2015) ("Where intentionally causing a 
result is an element of an offense, that element is established even if a 
different person than the actor intended was killed, injured, or harmed, or 
different property than the actor intended was damaged or otherwise 
affected."); State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727, 730-31 (Utah 1984) (rejecting the 
argument that the mental state for a lesser offense could satisfy the distinct 
mental state for a more serious offense), superseded by statute on other grounds 
as recognized in State v. Jimenez, 2012 UT 41, 'lJ 9 n.5, 284 P.3d 640. But the 
State does not rely on W.E.M.' s intent to shoulder check other students to 
establish his mental state for assault of a school employee. Rather, the State 
asserts that he acted with knowledge that he was shoulder checking a 
school employee. And as described below, the evidence of that mental state 
was sufficient to sustain the juvenile court's adjudication. 
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Zimmerman was a school employee. R56:15-16. So it is beyond dispute 
that if he knew he was shoulder checking Zimmerman, he knew he was 
assaulting a school employee. 6 
The juvenile court had sufficient evidence from which it could 
reasonably infer that W.E.M. knew he was shoulder checking Zimmerman 
because there was evidence from which it could infer that he saw 
Zimmerman before he shoulder checked her: The two were walking 
opposite directions down the same hall, facing each other; they had the 
opportunity to see each other before W.E.M. lowered his shoulder; and 
Zimmerman implied that she in fact saw W.E.M. before he lowered his 
shoulder. R56:10-12, 35. 
6 W.E.M. asserts in his statement of the issues that the juvenile court 
concluded that W.E.M. had the requisite mental state simply because he 
knew prior to the incident that Zimmerman was a school employee. Aplt. 
Br. at 1. W.E.M. forfeited that argument by failing to discuss it in the 
argument section of his brief. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); Gorostieta v. 
Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, ilil 43-44, 17 P.3d 1110. Regardless, nothing in the 
record supports that reading. The juvenile court acknowledged that W.E.M. 
knew who Zimmerman was because of his prior dealings with her, but it 
never stated that those prior dealings alone sufficed to establish the 
requisite mental state. R56:116-17. W.E.M. points to nothing that would 
overcome the "presumption of regularity" that attaches to trial court 
proceedings and findings. See State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65, ,I 21, 147 P.3d 
448. 
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W.E.M. has not shown otherwise. According to W.E.M., Zimmerman 
testified that "she had been coming around the corner" "immediately before 
the incident." Aplt. Br. at 22 (emphasis added). In fact, Zimmerman 
testified that she "d[id]n' t know how long" after she rounded the corner 
that W.E.M. shoulder checked her. R56:12. 
He also asserts that Zimmerman herself did not know who shoulder 
checked her "until after the incident" and "had to look back to see who did 
it.'~ Aplt. Br. at 22. But Zimmerman's testimony actually implies that she 
did see W.E.M. before he shoulder checked her. She testified explicitly that 
she did not see K.J., R56:17, but regarding W.E.M., she stated, "W was 
walking tmvards me and when we passed he ducked his shoulder down and 
shoulder bumped into me." R56:10 ( emphasis added). The juvenile court 
could reasonably interpret that statement to mean that Zimmerman did see 
W.E.M. even before he lowered his shoulder. 
When asked how soon before W.E.M. shoulder checked her she had 
seen him lowering his shoulder, she responded, "Just when he did it"; "It 
was all one act"; "It was all one motion." R56:14-15. But that does not 
mean that she did not see him before he lowered his shoulder. Zimmerman 
stated that after W.E.M. shoulder checked her, she "looked back to make sure 
[she] knew who did that and saw W and his friend walking." R56:11 
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(emphasis added). While the juvenile court could have interpreted that 
statement to mean that Zhn1nern1an had not noticed who had shoulder 
checked her and had to turn around to find out, the court also could have 
reasonably concluded that, given the totality of the testimony, Zimmerman 
had noticed W.E.M. walking toward her, had seen hhn lower his shoulder 
and shoulder check her as they passed, and then had turned around to make 
sure it was who she thought it was-as any reasonable school administrator 
would do. And given that reasonable reading of the evidence, 
Zimmerman's testimony provided a basis to infer that W.E.M. also had the 
opportunity to see her approaching before he lowered his shoulder and 
shoulder checked her. 
The record contains a surveillance video showing B-Hall at the time 
of the assault. The assault itself is not visible due to the poor quality of the 
image and the number of students in the hall, nor is W.E.M. or K.J. readily 
identifiable. Ex4:File2. But the video establishes a window of opportunity 
in which W.E.M. could have seen Zimmerman before the assault. The video 
suggests two points at which the assault may have occurred. First, although 
Zimmerman is not visible until she appears half-way down the hall, the 
teacher with who1n she was patrolling the halls appears, at the 7:32:14 mark, 
near the top of the screen, just having rounded the corner from C-Hall to B-
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Hall. Ex4:File2; R56:22, 49 ( describing Zhnmerman as wearing black and 
white, walking with a male teacher wearing red). That teacher pauses 
moments later, roughly from the 7:32:17 to the 7:32:20 mark, which presents 
the first possible moment of the assault. Ex4:File2. Second, in the middle of 
the hall, immediately after Zim1nerman first becomes visible on the screen, 
Zimmerman turns around to look behind her, at the 7:32:26 mark, which 
presents the second possible moment of the assault. Ex4:File2. W.E.M. thus 
may have had as much as twelve seconds in which he and Zimmerman 
were facing each other, from 7:32:14, when Zimmerman likely entered the 
hall, to 7:32:26, when she turned around to make sure she knew who hit her. 
Further, on multiple prior occasions, W.E.M. had done the same thing 
with and to his friends, and the objective of the behavior was clear: push 
one of your friends into someone else. R56:27-28. Regardless of whether 
the intended targets were other friends or strangers, it is natural that 
whoever is being pushed would look to see whom they were going to 
shoulder check. 
Circumstantial evidence can - indeed, often must- furnish proof of 
the requisite mental state. State v. Maughan, 2013 UT 37, ,r 15 n.3, 305 P.3d 
1058; In re J.S., 2012 UT App 340, ,r 5, 292 P.3d 709. And the totality of the 
circumstantial evidence here supports the trial court's finding that W.E.M. 
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knew he was shoulder checking Zimmerman. Furthermore, while the 
juvenile court could have believed W.E.M.' s testimony that he did not see 
Zimmerman until he hit her, R56:65, it hnplicitly rejected that testimony. 
Such credibility determinations are accorded significant deference. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a) ("[D]ue regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial 
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."); see also State v. Morris, 2011 
UT 40, ,r 28, 259 P.3d 116 ( deferring to a trial court's implicit credibility 
determination); R.B. v. L.B., 2014 UT App 270, ,r,r 31-32, 339 P.3d 137 
(same). And as shown, there was sufficient evidence from which the court 
could conclude that W.E.M. had the opportunity to see that he was shoulder 
checking Zimmerman. Therefore, the court's rejection of W.E.M.'s 
testhnony that he did not see Zimmerman was neither unreasonable nor 
against the clear weight of the evidence. 7 
W.E.M. correctly notes that a trial court's determination should be 
given less deference than a jury's. Aplt. Br. at 30-31. See State v. Goodman, 
7 K.J.'s testimony does not exclude the possibility that W.E.M. could 
have seen Zhnmerman before he shoulder checked her. K.J. testified that he 
did not target Zimmerman and he did not see her before he pushed W.E.M. 
R56:34, 40. But that testim.ony says nothing about the opportunity to see 
Zimmerman, whether W.E.M. in fact saw Zim1nerman, or whether K.J. or 
W.E.M. saw or could have seen Zimmerman after K.J. pushed W.E.M., but 
before W.E.M. lowered his shoulder and shoulder checked her. 
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763 P.2d 786, 787 (Utah 1988); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
But the point can be overstated. While a trial court's adjudication or verdict 
is given less deference than a jury's, it is given significantly more deference 
than many of a trial court's other rulings. See Gourdin By & Through Close v. 
Sharon's Cultural Educ. Recreational Ass'n (SCERA), 845 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 
1992) ("Had this been a bench trial or a jury verdict [rather than a directed 
verdict], we would affirm the result because we would apply a more 
deferential standard of review."). When the parties have had a full 
opportunity to present and test the facts below, appellate courts afford great 
deference to the determination of the fact finder-judge or jury-due to the 
fact finder's ability to hear live testimony, observe witnesses, and determine 
credibility first-hand. And the reasons for deference are strengthened in the 
case of juvenile courts. See In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ,r 11, 21 P.3d 680 
("[T]he juvenile court in particular is given a wide latitude of discretion as 
to the judgments arrived at based upon not only the court's opportunity to 
judge credibility firsthand, but also based on the juvenile court judges' 
special training, experience and interest in this field, and ... qevot[ ed] ... 
attention to such matters .... " (internal quotation marks omitted) (second 
alteration and omissions in original)). 
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Thus, in In re Z.D., the supreme court declared that the lesser degree 
of deference a trial court is given should inform but not supplant the 
application of the clear-error standard. 2006 UT 54, 'if 'if 21-23, 26-27. The 
court cautioned that in determining whether a finding is against the clear 
weight of the evidence, an appellate court should keep "one eye on the 
scales and the other fixed firmly on its duty of deference to findings of fact" 
and should forbear from "disturbing the close call." Id. 'if 33 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). So even if this case presented a close call, that 
call was for the juvenile court to make. The evidence supports the finding 
that W.E.M. knew he was assaulting a school employee. 
* * * 
The State provided sufficient evidence from which the juvenile court 
could conclude that W.E.M. assaulted a school employee: W.E.M. lowered 
his shoulder and crashed into Zimmerman in one fluid motion, W.E.M. had 
the opportunity to see Zimmerman before shoulder checking her, and the 
objective of W.E.M.' s behavior was to shoulder check others. The juvenile 
court could reasonably infer from these facts that W.E.M. acted voluntarily 
and with knowledge that he was shoulder checking a school employee-all 
that was required under the statute. 
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II. 
IF THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT THE EVIDENCE 
IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT W.E.M.'S 
ADJUDICATION FOR ASSAULT AGAINST A SCHOOL 
EMPLOYEE, IT SHOULD REMAND WITH 
DIRECTIONS TO ENTER AN ADJUDICATION FOR 
THE LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE OF SIMPLE 
ASSAULT. 
Even if the Court concludes that the evidence is insufficient to 
support a finding of assault against a school employee, the evidence is at 
least sufficient to establish that W.E.M. committed a simple assault. 
Therefore, in the event that this Court disagrees with the State on the first 
point, it should re1nand for the juvenile court to amend the adjudication to 
indicate that W.E.M. com1nitted assault. Cf In re L.G.W., 641 P.2d 127, 130 
(Utah 1982) (amending juvenile court's adjudication because evidence was 
sufficient to support lesser-included offense but not the greater). 
Assault is a lesser-included offense of assault against a school 
e1nployee. An offense is considered a lesser-included offense when "[i]t is 
established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to 
establish the c01nn1ission of the offense charged." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
402 (West 2015); see also In re L.G. W., 641 P.2d at 130 (applying the lesser-
included-offense analysis to juvenile court cases because, "[i]f proof fails on 
any particular element, there is no lack of notice or other unfairness in a 




entirely of some remaining elements of the offense or act charged in the 
complaint"). Because the statute criminalizing assault against a school 
employee incorporates assault as one of its elements, see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-102.3(1), assault will necessarily be established by "the same or less 
than all the facts required to establish the com1nission of" assault against a 
school employee, id. § 76-1-402. 
The evidence is sufficient here to establish that, if W.E.M. did not 
know he was shoulder checking a school employee, he still committed an 
assault The assault statute provides several variants by which a person can 
commit the offense. 8 Relevant here, the statute states that assault is "an act, 
8 When W.E.M. shoulder checked Zimmerman, the assault statute 
provided as follows: 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that 
causes bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk of 
bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; 
or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has know ledge of 
the pregnancy. 
( ... continued on next page) 
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committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to 
another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another." Id. § 76-5-
102(1) (West 2004). Because the statute does not specify a mental state, the 
default minimum mental state of recklessness applies. Id. § 76-2-102 (West 
2015). A person acts recklessly "with respect to circumstances surrounding 
his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or 
the result will occur." Id. § 76-2-103(3). Furthermore, "[t]he risk must be of 
such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all 
the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint." Id. 
By his own admission, W.E.M. acted recklessly. He repeatedly 
shoulder checked persons in the crowded halls of his school. His actions 
not only had the potential to lead to bodily injury, but did. W.E.M. 
acknowledged that he was aware that other people could get hurt as a result 
of his actions. R56:72-73, 75. But even after being warned by an assistant 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused 
serious bodily injury to another. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-102 (West 2004). The legislature has since amended 
the statute to re1nove "threat" as a variant of the offense. See id. (West 2015). 
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principal, W.E.M. continued shoulder checking. R56:99-100. Thus, W.E.M. 
was at least aware of the risk that his actions "create[ d] a substantial risk of 
bodily injury to another." Id. § 76-5-102(1). And as shown above, W.E.M.'s 
lowering of his shoulder when he was pushed demonstrates that W.E.M. 
was a voluntary participant and not a hapless victim. Having been 
forewarned, W.E.M.' s actions constituted a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in that situation. 
The evidence is thus more than sufficient to establish the lesser-included 
offense of simple assault. 
III. 
W.E.M.'S DISAGREEMENT WITH THE DECISION TO 
REFER HIS CASE TO JUVENILE COURT DOES NOT 
PROVIDE A BASIS FOR RELIEF. 
W.E.M. argues that his case should never have been referred to 
juvenile court. Aplt. Br. at 31-34. Of course, W.E.M. could have avoided 
the referral altogether by complying with the directives to cease assaulting 
persons in the school hallway. 
But once W.E.M. chose to continue his assaults, the choice of whether 
he should be referred to juvenile court no longer belonged to him. Rather, 
the law gives that choice to others. When a juvenile is arrested for an 
offense that would be a class A misde1neanor or greater if committed by an 
adult, the statute requires the peace officer to make a fonnal referral to the 
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juvenile court. Utah Code Am1. § 78A-6-602(2)(a) (West Supp. 2015). It is 
not clear whether W.E.M. was arrested. But even in situations not involving 
arrest for a class A misdemeanor or greater, referral is left to the discretion 
of the peace officer or any other person with reason to believe that a minor 
has committed an act that would bring him within the juvenile court's 
jurisdiction. See id. § 78A-6-602(2)(a), (4)(a); Utah R. Juv. P. 14(a)(l). The 
juvenile court's probation deparhnent then makes a preliminary inquiry "to 
determine whether the interests of the public or of the minor require that 
further action be taken." Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-6-602(2)(b); Utah R. Juv. P. 
14(a). If so, either the probation deparhnent or the county or district 
attorney are given discretion to file a petition seeking an adjudication fr01n 
the juvenile court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-602(2)(c); Utah R. Juv. P. 
14(a); cf. State v. Mahi, 901 P.2d 991, 1003 (Utah 1995) (stating in the criminal 
context that whether to file charges and which charges to file are, within 
certain constitutional limits, decisions left to the discretion of the prosecutor 
(citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)). The juvenile court 
then has authority to adjudicate whether the minor "violated any federal, 
state, or local law or municipal ordinance" - thus bringing him within the 
jurisdiction of the court- and to decide the appropriate disposition upon a 
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finding that he had. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-6-103(1)(a), -117(1)(a), -117(2) 
(West Supp. 2015). 
W.E.M. does not argue that there was any procedural misstep that 
deprived the juvenile court of authority to adjudicate him. He merely asks 
the Court to override the decision to adjudicate him based on his belief that 
his conduct was not serious enough to warrant the adjudication. But again, 
once W.E.M. chose to assault someone, the choice whether to refer him for 
an adjudication no longer belonged to him. 
W.E.M. has not shown otherwise. He cites no Utah law to establish 
that his referral was an abuse of discretion. Rather he relies on a 
concurrence in a Tenth Circuit order. But a single judge's view frmn a court 
whose decisions are not controlling is not a basis to override legislative 
policy and the discretion of either law enforcement or State's counsel. 
Furthermore, the concurring opinion has no persuasive force. In it, 
Judge Lucero criticizes Utah's juvenile justice system, but he founds the 
criticism on a misapprehension of that system. Judge Lucero refers 
repeatedly to Utah's juvenile justice syste1n as if it were "a criminal law 
system'' and criticizes it for treating juveniles "as if they were hardened 
criminals and with a lack of finesse." Hawker v. Sandy City Corp., 774 F.3d 
1243, 1245 (10th Cir. 2014) (Lucero, J., concurring). 
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But in truth, "[t]he State, through its juvenile justice system, responds 
to delinquent children more as a concerned parent rather than as an 
avenging angel." Paul Wake, Helping Children through the Juvenile Justice 
System: A Guide for Utah Defense Attorneys, 15 BYU J. Pub. L. 31, 32-33 
(2000). With limited exceptions, juvenile court delinquency proceedings are 
"civil proceedings with the court exercising equitable powers," and 
adjudication that a minor is within the court's jurisdiction "is not 
considered a conviction of a crime." Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-116(1), (2) 
(West Supp. 2015). Furthermore, the juvenile justice system is more 
"informal and flexible" than the criminal law syste1n. In re L. G. W, 641 P.2d 
at 129. That flexibility allows the juvenile court to approach each case with 
finesse in order to achieve the purposes of "community protection, 
competency development on the part of the child, and accountability to 
victims." Wake, Helping Children through the Juvenile Justice System, 15 BYU 
J. Pub. L. at 33; see also Utah Code Aim. § 78A-6-102(5) (West 2009) 
(identifying the statutory purposes of the juvenile justice system); In re 
L.G.W., 641 P.2d at 129 (noting the aims of the juvenile courts in fostering 
accountability and ensuring fair procedures and just results).9 
9 Furthennore, regardless of whether other states' juvenile justice 
( ... continued on next page) 
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That is what happened here. The juvenile court recognized that 
W.E.M. 1nay not have acted with the purpose of harming Zimmerman, but 
he had committed an offense nonetheless, and the evidence is sufficient to 
support that conclusion. In order to foster accountability on W.E.M.'s part, 
but recognizing that under the facts of this case, W.E.M. had not committed 
a particularly grievous offense, the juvenile court ordered W.E.M. to 
perform only twenty hours of compensatory service, imposed a suspended 
five-day term of detention, and ordered him to write a letter of apology to 
Zimmerman. R51-52. 
Therefore, W .E.M.' s policy arguments are unfounded and lack any 
cognizable basis for relief. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. In the alternative, 
it should remand for enh·y of an adjudication of assault. 
systems have created a "school-to-prison pipeline," Hawker, 774 F.3d at 1245 
(Lucero, J., concurring), Utah's system has not. "Most children who come to 
juvenile court don't come back more than once, if at all." Wake, Helping 
Children through the Juvenile Justice System, 15 BYU J. Pub. L. at 49 & n.82 
(presenting statistics on Utah's juvenile justice system). 
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A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his 
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the 
result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will 
occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard 
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
( 4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he 
ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of a nature and 
degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
·Vil 
76-5-102. Assault -- Penalties. 
(1) Assault is: 
( a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily 
injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has know ledge of the pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily 
injury to another. 
76-5-102.3. Assault against school employees. 
(1) Any person who assaults an employee of a public or private school, with 
knowledge that the individual is an employee, and when the employee is 
acting within the scope of his authority as an employee, is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(2) As used in this section," employee" includes a volunteer. 
